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In order to measure the strength of the parties in each state, the Major Party Index (MPI) was built by averaging the results of the six major elections that take place in the fifty states. T h~s index allows us to describe the absolute and comparatlve partisan leaning of each state In each elect~on and identify trends of party strength over time within individual states, among regions, and within the nation as a whole. The MPI sheds considerable light on three general developments: (1) a national change from Democratic dominance In the 1980s to a Republican edge by 2002, (2) significant regional realignments in the South and Neu-England, and (3) a strong trend toward greater consistency between partisan voting at the federal and state levels. P arty strength in the United States is generally measured by public opinion polls in which respondents report their own partisan identification. There are well-known advantages to this approach. It permits analyses that relate an individual's party preference to attitudinal and demographic factors, thereby allowing for the generation and testing of hypotheses about the causes of party attachment. Self-identification can also be correlated with reported votes, which allows for inquiries into the relative importance of party preference for electoral beha\lor. For these reasons, poll surveys have become the preferred standard in academic research. But this method has admitted weaknesses. Polls are expensive and they often have a significant margin of error, which in the case of general national polls increases greatly as one begins to investigate particular sub-groups or geographical regions. Partisan self-identification by itself, moreover, does not tell us how people actually vote. For example, many white Southerners after 1950 identified themselves as Democrats or independents even as they had become reliable Republican voters at the presidential level. Finally, partisan self-identification itself says nothing about the habitual behavior-if it existsof independents. Many analysts today suspect that most voters who call themselves independents in fact have a fairly distlnct partisan leaning when it comes to casting their ba1lots.l Another approach to assessing party strength is to look at election results and measure party standing by the votes each party's candidates received. This method also has its strong points. It is inexpensive (at least for scholars), as the government picks u p all of the costs of the research project by holding elections. The margin of error is fa~rly low, with the inaccuracies being limited to fraud and the now welldocumented difficulties encountered in counting and recording votes (hanging chads, undervotes, voting machine failure, and the like).2 Election results also have Pol~tical Research Quariet.ly, Vol. 58, No. 2 Uune 2005) . pp. [245] [246] [247] [248] [249] [250] [251] [252] [253] [254] [255] [256] the advantage of directly measuring the phenomenon: if one is interested in party strength, it makes great sense to look at how citizens actually vote. Still, there are weaknesses In using electoral results. The statistics are tied to aggregates (collective units), not to individuals, which makes it impossible to connect the vote to attitudinal variables and difficult to relate it to many demographic factors (other, of course, than geography itself).3 Another problem is that a vote for a particular candidate is by no means the same thing as an expression of support for a party; it may only reflect a preference for a particular individual, as when millions of Democrats pulled the lever for the war hero Dwight Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956. Election results from any single election may therefore reveal little about "real" or "normal" party strength.
All approaches are bound to have strengths and weaknesses, and the question of a measurement's worth should be judged on the practical grounds of its helpfulness as an investigative tool. Despite the drawbacks just noted, the idea of measuring party strength on the basis of election results seems attractive enough to hold considerable interest for political scientists-not as a substitute for, but as a supplement to, polling methods. Yet this approach is virtually absent from contemporary political science. Frequently, of course, one comes across rule-of-thumb descriptions that refer to election outcomes. Pick up any book on elections and you will likely read statements such as "Massachusetts voted Democratic in the last four presidential elections," thus qualifying it as a solidly Democratic state. General historical studies also frequently rely on such characterizations as in Black and Black's (1992) characterization of the South: "For more than six decades, from 1880-1944, the eleven states of the old Confederacy . . . regularly voted as a solid block in favor of the presidential candidate of the Democratic Partyn4 Such references, however, are completely ad hoc; they have no common standard and offer no basis for systematic communication among those studying party strength. What is needed, clearly, is a general index to which all can refer. The idea behind an index-think for example of the Dow Jones index-is to capture in one number a measure that supplies a broad picture and that can problde a baseline for charting trends and movements in party strength.
A few political scientists in the period between 1960 and 1989 sought to devise such an index. These efforts did not gain wide currency at the time, and none of them has been updated or remains in use today. Part of the reason is no doubt the aforementioned appeal of survey data. But another reason, we would argue, is to be found in the flaws in these indexes. With improvements, we believe it is possible to construct a measure that overcomes some of the past difficulties and that can serve today as a helpful tool for political analysis. The objective is to construct a measure that captures the underlying strength of the parties while managing to absorb and smooth out distortions of particular elections.
Any measurement using electoral results must, as noted, proceed on the basis of geographical units. This unit could be as small as the precinct. But for the purposes of a general index for the whole of American politics, the state is the proper starting point. States serve as the unit for selecting presidential electors, senators, and governors. Additionally, state majorities generally determine the majority party in state legislatures. In order to measure the underlying strength of the parties in each state, we have built an index that averages the results of the elections for the six major offices that take place in each of the fifty states: president, U.S. senator, U.S. representative, governor, state senator, and state representative.
Our Major Party Index (MPI) allows one to describe the absolute and comparative partisan leaning of each state in each election year and to identify trends of party strength over time within individual states, among regions, and (by weighting populations) within the nation as a whole. It is also possible, by breaking the index into subindexes, to measure the consistency of partisan voting between state and federal offices and to observe whether partisan voting patterns at these two levels are moving further apart or closer together. The MPI can be used, as will be demonstrated, to shed considerable light on some of the major developments in modern electoral politics.
Past indexes of party strength employed different methods to determine which elections to observe and how to weight the different components in relation to one another. The diversity in approaches resulted in part from the researchers' different interests and purposes, but it also highlights some of the difficulties in using electoral results to come to grips with measuring the abstraction of party strength. Previous indexes were generally based on averaging aggregate party vote totals for particular offices over a particular period of time. Cox's (1960) index used vote totals for federal elections only.i By contrast, Ranney (1965) and King (1989) measured the level of party competition only in state-level contest^.^ A few efforts combined results from both levels, as we shall do here (Hofferbert 1964; David 1972; Bullock 1988) . ' Another point of difference revolved around the type of data employed and the frequency of observation. Some indexes employed the raw vote totals or percentages of the vote each party won (Hofferbert 1964; Ranney 1965; David1972; King 1989) . Others relied solely on the number of seats each party held (Bullock 1988) . The frequency of observation also varied. Some indexes were based on long periods of aggregate analysis (Hofferbert, Ranney, King), while others took new measurements every two years (David. Bullock). The Cox Index used a combination of these approaches. These indexes were also used for different purposes. Hofferbert and King sought to determine the level of competition in each state and ascertain which party was in control, while others were more concerned with observing partisanship over time and in analyzing the reasons for change (Cox, Ranney, David, Bullock) .
These previous attempts to examine party competition demonstrate the diversity of opinion over what should be measured and how such measurements should be carried out. They also reveal, however, some methodological drawbacks, even when taking account of the purposes for which they were intended. Three of these indexes deserve further attention because their successes and failures informed the development of our new measure.
The Cox Index was an early effort to measure party competit~on in and between the states. Relying solely on vote totals for federal offices, Cox labeled each state as either Democratic or Republican and classified it as either "safe" for a party, "generally" for a part); or "marginal" when neither party was dominant."^ a result of only looking at national elections, Cox concluded that most states were "marginal," or not aligned with a party While this conclusion may have had validity at the federal level in the postWorld War I1 years, it certainly did not describe the situation within the states. Some of the states, particularly in the South, were competitive in presidential elections, but were strongly supportive of one party at the state level.
Cox's index was also methodologically flawed in that each biennial observation included only the elections that occurred in that particular year. Thus, congressional races were included in every measure, while presidential voting was only part of the measure in every other biennial observation. As a result, the measurement varied enormously based on whether a presidential election was held, making it difficult to draw conclusions or demonstrate trends over time. The index failed to supply a comparable measure for each observation.
Ranney's index is perhaps the most well known. In contrast to Cox, Ranney only measured intra-state contests and excluded federal offices. His index also differed from Cox's in that it considered the longevity of party control of the governorships and the legislatures in addition to partisan vote totals for governor, state senate, and state house. Ranney used his measure to assign each state to one of five categories: "One Party Republican," "Modified One-Party Republican," "One Party Democratic," "Modified One-Party Democratic," and "Two-part^."^ The Ranney Index has a number of limitations. One problem is that it measures only state-level elections and gives an insufficient measure of party competition writ large.'" Another drawback is that the Ranney Index cannot be used to examine individual years because of its consideration of a party's longevity of control.
Finally, Paul T. David's (1972 David's ( , updated 1974 David's ( , 1976 David's ( , 1978 index averaged the vote for governor, U.S. Senate, and U.S. House elections and classified states as "predominantly Democratic," "predominantly Republican," or "~ompetitive."'His index is more comprehensive than Cox's or Ranneyk because it considered both state and federal elections. In addition, David's index took these three factors into consideration at each biennial observation, thus avoiding the inconsistency of Cox's measurement. (The results of the last governork race were included in the index, even if a gubernatorial race did not take place in that year.) Nonetheless, David's index also has problematic features. Although it includes both federal and state electoral competition, it omits the most important of all elections in America: the contest for the presidency. In addition, given the three races David uses, his index assigns two-thirds of the weight to national voting and one-third to state voting. No compelling reason is given for this weighting. David's index, finally, seems skewed because, within the intra-state component, he includes elections for the governorship but omits those for the state legislatures, which seem just as important. The Major Party Index (MPI) is intended to measure the level and extent of interparty competition in and between the states. It builds on previous findings by providing a means to identify states dominated by one party (as Cox and Ranney Indexes did) as well as to observe important characteristics of the national electorate in specific years and over time. It also improves on most past indexes by including both federal and state elections. Each component within these two arenas is weighed evenly-indeed, there is no compelling reason to assign them different values. Of course, the construction of any index has an arbitrary element to it but the MPI has the most logical makeup possible. Although the index cannot be said to offer a perfect representation of American party strength-no measurement can-the hope is that it will offer a more comprehensive and more reliable picture than any index thus far proposed.
Design
The Major Party Index is comprised of six weighted components calculated on even numbered years for each state, from 1990 to 2002. Three of these components are based on elections for national offices and three for state-level offices. Within the federal portion, half of the weight is assigned to presidential elections and half to Congressional elections. Similarly, the state component is evenly divided between the governorship and the state legislature. This is an appropriate weighting scheme because it attaches equal importance to the two arenas of government in our federal system and, within each arena, to the executive branch and the legislative branch. The MPI takes all of the major elective offices into account, thereby fulfilling the aim of being a comprehensive measure.
The index is based on a two-party evaluation. Thirdparty candidates have been eliminated in all six components. A value for all components is entered for each biennial observation, which is accomplished by using the most recent presidential and gubernatorial election results if none was held in a given year. The components and their weights are listed in Table 1 .
The first component of the MPI and the first nationally based measure is the two-party vote for president in each state's most recent presidential election. Thus in 2000, the '* In addltlon, calculat~ng the index for three partles rather than two lessens comparative opportun~tles By lncludlng third partles m his formulation, Dav~d decreases the marglnal difference between the two major parties, making them more d~fficult to compare By uslng t\vo-party vote totals the major partles become mlrror images of each other, lncreaslng and decreasing In proport~on to one another The changes in partisan support are thus amphiled and a more realist~c and meaningful analysis of the malor partles is poss~ble.
= The fifth measure, also at the state level, is the two-party percentage of all seats in each state's Senate. The Major Party Index value is determined in this case by dividing the number of Republican seats by the sum of Democratic and Republican seats. There were two reasons in this case for using seats (as opposed to votes) as the basis of calculation: vote totals for state legislative electlons are difficult to find, and many of these races are uncontested (a large number of uncontested seats skews the two-party vote totals).16 This component is weighted as 12.5 percent of the total index.
The final component of the MPI, and the third state-level measure, is the two-party percentage of seats in state houses. This score is calculated in the same way as that for the state senate and is worth 12.5 percent of the total index value.17
The sum of these components is then calculated to determine the biennial Major Party Index value in each state. The MPI is based on Republican scores in a two-party evaluation. The Democratic value is the inverse of the Republican score. Thus, as the numerical value increases, a state becomes more Republican and, conversely, as the value decreases, a state becomes more Democratic. The formula for each state in each even numbered year, then, is: Table 3 ).
The most significant change in the state breakdown by partisan leaning occurred in 1994. That year's elections, of 20  17  27  Democratic States  3 0  33  2 3 course, were dominated by the Republicans, who won control of both chambers of Congress for the first time since 1954. Republicans also made notable gains at the state level, both in gubernatorial and state legislative elections. The change in the partisan breakdown, with Republicans gaining the MPI advantage in ten states, reinforces our confidence in the measure. While the index smoothes out the value by spreading it over a number of election contests (including some in previous years), it is sufficiently sensitive to quickly register large and broad changes.
Computing partisan advantage by the number of states, however, tells only part of the story Any kind of national measure must also take into account the states' respective populations. While the Republicans currently enjoy an advantage in 34 states, this does not necessarily indicate that they are now the dominant party nationally. Several of the largest states remain in the Democrats' column, including three of the five most populous states: California ( l ) , New York (3), and Illinois (5). On the other side of the ledger, seven of the Republican states are among the ten smallest states in the country, including Wyoming (50), Alaska (48), North Dakota (47), South Dakota (46), Montana (44), and New Hampshire (41).
Weighting the data to take electoral strength into account allows for a proportional examination. Going back to 2000, the year of the last presidential election, the data indicated almost perfect electoral parity between the parties. Republican states accounted for 277 of the 535 state electoral votes (51.8 percent), while the Democratic states had a total of 258 (48.2 percent). (The District of Columbia, with its three electoral votes for the presidency, is not included; the Democrats have a complete lock on the District's votes, r There is a more comprehensive way to indicate national party strength by one simple measure. It is to take the MPI of each state, weight it according to its electoral strength, and then calculate a national average. This measure is the Dow Jones of political fortunes, representing in our view the slngle best general measure of party strength. Even if the meaning of the absolute levels may be questioned, the measurements of relative change are instructive. The index is shown in Chart 1.'' ' "h~s cornpanson IS st111 slightly blased tos-ard the Republicans Electoral votes are determ~ned by the number of Congressional d~strlcts In a state and the number of Un~ted States SenaLors. Congressional dlstr~cts are apportloned based on populat~on b u~ evev state has two Senators Thus, smaller states \v11l haw more electoral mtes under this system than if apportionment was determ~ned str~ctly by populat~on U'elghtmg the population based on electoral votes, though, is arguably more lns~ghtful because the pres~dency 1s the only off~ce voted upon by the entire country and the wmner 1s determ~ned based on the electoral college 2 1 Desp~teshowing tmo llnes, there 1s really only one number to t h~s index. The Democra~~c score IS calculated as 100 mlnus he Republ~can The Major Party Index also highlights one of the most striking developments of American politics in recent times: strong (and partly offsetting) regional realignments. The Souths realignment is the greatest.22 Table 5 displays Republican gains in the region. In 1990, the first year covered by the MPI, every Southern state except South Carolina was in the Democratic column. Since then there has been a huge shift toward the Republican Party Every Southern state increased its MPI value, with the result that all of the states with the exception of Arkansas now show a Republican advantage (Alabama is almost dead even). A few states experienced truly dramatic shifts during these twelve years. For instance, Georgia and Texas increased their MPI values by 12.2 and 12.0,respectively Accounts of Southern politics have traced the outlines of this transformation. The Southern realignment towards Republicans began in the 1950s, at the presidential level, in the two Eisenhower elections. The strength of the party in presidential elections began to spread thereafter, and by the time of the three "Reagan elections" (1980, 1984, and 1988) , Republicans won the electoral vote of every Southern state except Georgia in 1980 Uimmy Carters home state). No non-Southern Democrat has captured a Southern score Data points are as follows 1990: 46.55R 53.45D; 1992 45 33R, 54.67D; 1994 49 50R, iO.jOD, 1996 1998 49.42R, 50 i8D; 2000 50.41R, 49 59D, 2002 For the purposes of this paper, the South is defined in accordance wlth the longstanding polltical science consensus grounded in YO.Key3 State since 1968, and A1 Gore, a Southern candidate, lost all of the Southern states in 2000. The realigning process worked its way gradually to representation in the Senate, the House and the governors' mansions. A threshold was crossed in the 1994 election. In 1992 a majority of both the senators and House members from the South were Democrats, as had been the case for more than a century; but after the 1994 elections, the majority in both cases were Republicans. A similar, if slower, trend has followed at the state level. In 1990 the Republicans did not control a single legislature of a single state in the South, whereas by 2002 they had a majority in 10 of the regions 22 legislative bodies. The good news for Republicans in the South is that they have gained tremendously over the past half-century and even the past decade. The bad news may be that, for nationallevel offices, they are nearing their peak (though substantial gains remain in the offing for some of the state legislat u r e~) .~? The only state in the South to avoid a full tip to the GOP has been Arkansas, although it too has been moving slowly in that direction. Part-but only part-of its resistance was due to the fact that ~t was the home state to President Clinton in 1992 and 1996.
New England also experienced a realignment but-in contrast to the South-in favor of the Democrats. Given the national trend towards the Republicans, Democratic gains in New England are impressive--even if they are more modest than Republican gains in the South. American politics scholars for years have considered the South to be a "special case," but it may now be time to consider New England in that light. In their voting for Democrats, some of the New England states strongly resemble the states of the South during the heyday of one-party dominance. In fact, New England qualified in 2000as the region that is furthest from the national average or midpoint.
A third and final trend that can be studied by our data relates to the complex relationship between national and state-level voting. This analysis proceeds by breaking the MPI down into two sub-indexes, one for federal offices and one for state offices. In compiling these sub-indexes the executive and legislative branches are weighted equally, These two indexes replicate, in effect, the intentions of the Cox Index (federal) and the Ranney Index (state). Our concern here was to study the states having a "schizophrenic" profile, which we defined as having: (a) an MPI that was of a different valence for each subindex, i.e., Republican at one level and Democratic at another, and (b) a difference between these scores of more than six points (the latter provision is introduced to eliminate states that were in a condition of essential competiti\reness at both levels). A schizophrenic profile indicates what amounts to a different partisan pattern on the two levels of government. In 1990, 17 states that fell into this category, whereas by 2002 the number had decreased to only ten.:' This suggests growing congruence in the partisan voting patterns between state and federal voting, and it would be interesting to see if the trend noticed here is an important movement that took place chiefly within the last decade. It remains, of course, to be seen, if a less schizophrenic electorate is also a happier and healthier one.
